Introduction
After the adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, ET has attracted the attention of many Annex I countries as a flexible mechanism for the mitigation of global warming. There is a pressing need to introduce DET as soon as possible in order to gain experiences of trading before 2008, when the first commitment period will begin. Denmark and UK have already launched DET respectively. The scheme in UK is wider than that of Denmark which is aimed at only electricity generators. Moreover, UK scheme is well combined with existing climate policies such as CCL and CCLA, and strongly conscious of consistency with International Emissions Trading (IET) scheme. Thus it gives important implications when we consider the introduction of DET to Japan.
In this paper, we extract important elements from the introductory background and the argument on scheme design of DET in UK Emissions Trading Group (ETG) and suggest a direction of DET scheme design in Japan based on the comparison of those elements with the current situation of Japan. , and encouraged the argument on introduction of DET. ETG has played a central role in designing the DET scheme in UK . It suggests following golden rules for DET scheme design2), namely (1) Environmental rationale, (2) Economic rationale , (3) Credible, (4) Simplicity, (5) Equity, (6) Transparency, (7) Credit for past action, (8) Certainty, and (9) Inclusive . The following discussions are based on these golden rules.
Energy efficiency and trading
First of all, ETG discussed whether Energy Efficiency Trading (EET), which is based on energy efficiency improvements not on carbon emissions reduction, was acceptable or not3). CCLA accepts four kindsof targets, carbon efficiency, absolute carbon, energy efficiency and absolute energy targets. The industry associations seems to be in favor of energy efficiency targets, it could be verified by the fact that as much as 33 out of 44 participating sectors chose energy efficiency targets (There is no sector using absolute carbon targets so far)4). Moreover, improvements of energy efficiency contribute to CO2 reduction in almost all sectors5). For these reasons, ETG had to consider EET in addition to carbon trading scheme.
However, adoption of EET requires to convert energy units into carbon units. That may cause discrepancy through using fixed energy to carbon conversion factor. For example, carbon intensity of electricity generated by hydraulic power and the one by thermal power are quietly different. Even if both reduce the same amount of electricity, it will not mean they reduce the same amount of carbon. Thus, low-qualified permits will be inevitably generated from energy-related targets holders, and it will lower the credibility of the scheme. What is worse, EET cannot cap the amount of emissions. Additionally, EET is not compatible with IET, which assumes absolute carbon scheme. For these reasons, special handling was required to adopt EET.
Linking energy efficiency agreements with absolute carbon in a carbon cap and trade system
Due to the negative effects of adopting EET, there was a need to restrict on trades between unit and absolute sectors. The following linking options were discussed3): 1. Turning the energy efficiency agreements into carbon agreements 2. Transforming the credits into permits 3. Introducing gateway (a mechanism to ensure that permits sold from the unit sector do not swamp the absolute sector) The pros and cons of each option are listed in Table 1 . Option 1 and 2 were rejected for low feasibility and permit value risks respectively. Finally, option 3 was adopted. It suggests that ETG placed importance on evasion of permit value risks in spite of the increased complexity due to the introduction of gateway.
3.4
Permit quality ETG said "Within the UK, so long as the government is prepared to accept permits from both unit and absolute sectors against targets, the primary concern would be fairness, but the system could operate anyway. Internationally however, UK permits may not be acceptable for export to other countries if the carbon reductions associated with them cannot be effectively verified6)." That is, permit quality is a primary concern especially in IET. EET scheme will inevitably generate such low-qualified permits. Gateway can ease this problem, but cannot remove. Two options were discussed to ensure permit quality.
1. Prohibiting international trading by unit sector 2. Requiring unit sector to provide a verifiable, firm specific, baseline ccnversion factor between its energy use and carbon emissions in order to trade domestically. ETG adopted option 2 because it could kill two birds with one stone (confidence in the domestic scheme and wider international trading).
In spite of increased complexity and additional costs to provide such reliable conversion factor, they emphasized permit quality.
Incentives for taking on absolute targets
Considering the consistency with future IET scheme, incentives for shifting from unit targets to absolute targets, and for entering the scheme with absolute targets were required. There were some existing incentives for taking on absolute targets (listed in table 2). However, ETG considered these were not enough and they should introduce further incentives. Further incentives were divided roughly into administrative and financial incentives.
As administrative incentives, they discussed three options beloW3):
1. Prohibiting banking by organizations in unit sector
Closing gateway in 2008
3. Prohibiting the project-based credits for compliance by organizations in unit sector Option 1 was rejected because the industry strongly opposed to it. Option 2 was adopted because it did not entail immediate restrictions and could give a strong incentive to shift into absolute targets in the future. Option 3 was also adopted because details of baseline setting rules of project had not been decided yet and allowing this option would figure  2 . According to the argument aboveand figure  1 , the key elements are:
•oe Permit quality
•oe Risk aversion of permit value 
Comparison of introductory backgrounds
The key elements of introductory backgrounds of UK and Japan are arranged in table 3. Compared with UK,Japan has fewer margins in achievement of Kyoto target, and recognition of the necessity of ET is not enough. The strong opposition from the industry is also the major obstacle. For these obstacles, Japanese proposal ended up with the scheme based on short-term vision. Table 3 .
Comparison of introductory backgrounds between UK and Japan
Comparison of key elements of DET scheme
Next, a comparison of the key elements of DET scheme in UK wih Japanese proposal is presented. According to the figure 3, we can find that Japanese proposal lacks the elements related to environmental aspects though satisfy the economical aspects. Moreover, there is a possibility that a system may not begin to move even in its initial stage because of the lack of incentives for voluntary entry into the scheme, which is important especially in the initial stage.
Even in UK, where the industry is in favor of introduction of DET and the government budgets for finandal incentives, the number of new entrants was only 34 organizations except for those via CCLA. It shows that incentives for voluntary entry into the scheme are indispensable in such country where the recognition of necessity of ET is not sufficient as Japan. In sum, the major problems of Japanese proposal are as follows: It is clear that Japan will be a buyer of permits.
On the other hand, credibility of the scheme is important in international trading. As is mentioned in above, Japanese proposal lacks of credibility and this may be an obstacle in international trading. In order to ensure credibility, we recommend the gradual abolishment of energy scheme, which is the main cause of low-qualified permits.
On the other hand, ETG admitted that mechanisms like Gateway are not recommended because they make the system extremely complex Thus, we propose the gradual abolishment of unit carbon scheme to simplify the scheme and to make it compatible with IET. The main reason why UK had to introduce gateway was that low-qualified permits from unit energy sector would harm credibility and the abilly to reach her Kyoto target. Abolishment of energy scheme can ease the problem of low-qualified permit. Moreover, negative impacts of low-qualified permits from unit sector will be relatively small because organizations in Japan cannot generate as many permits as in UK. It is also important that we should provide sufficient incentives for voluntary entry into the scheme at least in the initial stage.
Conclusion
The key elements of introductory background of DET are, (1) Recognition of necessity of ET, (2) High possibility of Suggested direction of DET scheme design becoming a seller of permits, (3) Collaboration between the government and the industry, and (4) Scheme design based on long-term vision. On the other hand, key elements of DET scheme in UK are (1) Permit quality, (2) Rik aversion of permit value, (3) Incentives for voluntary entry into the scheme, and (4) Compatibility with IET. Comparing these elements with Japanese current situation and proposal of DET, it is recommended to abolish energy scheme and unit carbon scheme gradually.
